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Seeking Multilateral Protection for
Intellectual Property: The United States
"TRIPs" over Special 301
Robert J. Pechman
The United States introduced the Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in order to cre-
ate internationally binding minimum standards of protection for
intellectual property. These standards are enforced through the
dispute settlement agreement of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The United States now looks to WTO dispute settle-
ment as an alternative and a supplement to more coercive uni-
lateral measures such as section 182 of the Omnibus Trade Act
of 1974, commonly referred to as "Special 301." This Note hy-
pothesizes that the United States will be forced to rely on Spe-
cial 301-type measures to give effect to the provisions of TRIPs
because the WTO dispute settlement process will prove to be in-
adequate. In addition, the same unilateral measures upon
which the United States will depend to advance TRIPs will be
susceptible to attack under the WTO agreements, thus weaken-
ing their effectiveness. As a result, the United States' ability to
externalize its strong intellectual property rights protection will
suffer, particularly when viewed against its ability to do so
before the implementation of TRIPs.
This Note examines the probable relationships between and
interactions of the TRIPs Agreement and unilateral measures
used by the United States in the protection of intellectual prop-
erty interests internationally. First, the introduction of the
TRIPs Agreement is discussed, with an emphasis on problems
with past multilateral intellectual property agreements and the
major shortcomings embodied in the TRIPs Agreement itself.
Next, the development of Special 301 and its past and current
uses by the United States is introduced. Lastly, this Note ana-
lyzes the likely interactions between TRIPs and Special 301 and
predicts whether the United States will in fact be able to effec-
tively use TRIPs and Special 301 to advance its goal of strong
international intellectual property protection.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE INTRODUCTION OF TRIPS
For over 100 years there has been an ongoing effort to glob-
ally harmonize intellectual property rights,1 and a number of
agreements in pursuit of this objective have been reached.
Although the various agreements to this end have targeted dif-
ferent areas,2 their ultimate goal has been movement towards
1. See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED
RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1975). For a brief intro-
duction of the development of international protection of intellectual property
rights, see id. at 1-16. Intellectual property includes patents, copyrights and
trademarks. This Note tends to focus on patent law but applies to intellectual
property rights in general.
2. The oldest international treaty protecting patent rights internationally
is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. It was drafted
in 1880, ratified in 1883, and implemented in 1884. Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1883, last re-
vised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinaf-
ter Paris Convention]. The main principle espoused by the Paris Convention is
one of national treatment. That is, each Member agrees to grant the same pro-
tection to citizens of other Member countries as it does its own citizens under its
intellectual property laws. Anthony D. Sabatelli, Impediments to Global Patent
Law Harmonization, 22 N. Ky. L. REV. 579, 591-92 (1995). The Paris Conven-
tion does not, however, impose substantive standards on its Members. Id. at
592. The most recent revision of the Paris Convention, in Stockholm in 1967,
established the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as its main
administrative body. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 563
(Marshall A. Leaffer ed., 1990). WIPO is now an agency of the United Nations
and oversees all major intellectual property treaties and conventions. Id. at 13.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
extends the basic principles espoused by the Paris Convention into the realm of
copyright protection. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Works, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, last revised at Paris July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), enacted in the United States on Jan-
uary 24, 1978, standardized international patent application filing procedures
so that only a single application designating each country in which patent pro-
tection is sought need be filed. Patent Cooperation Treaty, opened for signature
June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. The PCT does not, however,
define substantive standards for patentability. Sabatelli, supra, at 595-96.
The European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in Munich, Germany
on October 5, 1973 and entered into force on October 7, 1977. Convention on
the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 270 (1974). Like the PCT, the EPC pro-
vides standard procedures for filing international patent applications, although
the EPC is limited to countries of the European Union. Sabatelli, supra, at 596.
However, the EPC also defines patentable subject matter and provides other
substantive standards. Id.
In addition, the Eurasian Patent Convention (EAPC) came into force early
in 1996. Richard P. Beem, Patent Developments in Eastern and Central Europe
and the Former Soviet Union, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 483, 483
(1996). The EAPC provides for a Eurasian patent that may be obtained by fil-
ing a single application with the Eurasian Patent Office and that is enforceable
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internationally recognized and enforceable intellectual property
rights. These attempts have, by and large, failed to fully harmo-
nize intellectual property protection because they have done lit-
tle to address two major problems: defining minimum standards
of protection 3 and providing adequate dispute resolution mecha-
nisms.4 A general unwillingness to give up national sovereignty
in exchange for a viable solution to these problems has led to the
failure of recent harmonization efforts.5
International intellectual property agreements that provide
for national treatment without defining minimum standards,
such as the Paris Convention, have an inherent problem -
member nations are free to treat foreign interests poorly as long
in all nine contracting countries. Id. The contracting countries as of July 3,
1996 were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Id. at 484.
3. For example, the Paris Convention does not provide minimum stan-
dards of protection for intellectual property. See supra note 2 (discussing the
Paris Convention).
4. For example, the Paris Convention leaves the enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights up to the laws of each nation, making it impossible to
achieve a global settlement between parties. John R. Thomas, Litigation Be-
yond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational
Patent Enforcement, 27 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 290-91 (1996). Some re-
gional agreements, such as the EAPC, provide mechanisms for adjudicating in-
tellectual property disputes. See supra note 2 (describing the EAPC).
5. Recently, two proposed patent harmonization treaties failed to be rati-
fied. First, WIPO proposed a treaty that grew out of a series of meetings con-
ducted since 1985, which had addressed the problems with achieving worldwide
patent law harmonization. The WIPO proposal was drafted in 1987, and in
1991 the treaty was revised for final negotiations. The scope of this treaty was
similar to the EPC in that it sought to completely unify patent procurement
procedures. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 599-600 and 604-11. Ultimately, the
United States halted negotiations because it was unwilling to make two funda-
mental changes in its patent law called for in the WIPO harmonization treaty,
namely awarding patents on a first-to-file basis rather than a first-to-invent
basis, and publishing all patent applications eighteen months after filing. Id. at
605. In addition, the protection of intellectual property rights under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has shifted the focus of patent harmoniza-
tion efforts away from WIPO. See generally Monique L. Cordray, GATT v.
WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 121 (1994) (discussing the higher
standards of intellectual property protection provided by TRIPs as compared to
those provided by the standards of traditional WIPO treaties; how the U.S.
achieved those higher standards; GATT's relatively effective dispute settlement
mechanisms; and enforcement procedures required by TRIPs).
Second, the European Union sought to expand on the EPC through the
Community Patent Convention (CPC), which would create a single multina-
tional patent for all Union Members. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 597-98. The
CPC proposal was the first attempt at complete harmonization of patent laws
among several nations. Id. at 598. The CPC was last revised and amended in
1985, but to date has not been ratified by all EU Members. Id. at 597.
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as domestic interests are treated just as poorly. The national
treatment provision of the Paris Convention states, "Nationals
of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the protec-
tion of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or
may hereafter grant, to nationals .... *"6 Under this reciprocity
requirement, no member nation may afford protection to its own
citizens under its intellectual property laws unless it affords the
same protection to the nationals of the other member nations.
However, the Paris Convention does not require its members to
adhere to any substantive standards of patent protection.7
Thus, a member nation is free to provide as much or as little
patent protection as it wishes, so long as it guarantees equal
treatment for domestic and foreign claimants.8 For example,
Brazil and India, although members of the Paris Convention,
have historically provided little or no patent protection for phar-
maceutical products whether they be foreign or domestic. 9 Mini-
mum standards of protection would cure this shortcoming of
national treatment by defining a baseline to which all members
could be held accountable.
The second major problem afflicting international intellec-
tual property agreements is insufficient enforcement mecha-
nisms. Again, the Paris Convention indicates how inadequate
such measures may often be.10 The Paris Convention, as admin-
istered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
requires disputes between members to be settled by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ).11 However, many members do not
recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ.12 Those members that do
recognize the ICJ often do not utilize its procedures, and even
when the ICJ makes a ruling, it may be ignored. 13 Other disad-
vantages of the Paris Convention enforcement procedures in-
clude a reliance on the voluntary cooperation of any party
receiving an unfavorable judgment and the absence of a mecha-
nism requiring and implementing the seizure of infringing
6. Paris Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
7. See supra note 2 (discussing Paris Convention's lack of substantive pat-
ent protection standards for individual countries); Thomas, supra note 4, at
289.
8. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 592-93.
9. Id. at 593.
10. Id. at 592-593.
11. Cordray, supra note 5, at 131.
12. Id.
13. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 592 n. 58.
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goods. 14 Therefore, the nationals of Paris Convention members
must rely heavily on separate adjudication in each country
where patent protection is sought. 15 Because of these shortcom-
ings, international agreements such as the Paris Convention
have been highly criticized. As a set of procedures through
which members may challenge other members' compliance with
the WIPO Conventions, WIPO dispute settlement mechanisms
have been called "effectively worthless."16
Both of these problems-the lack of minimum standards
and the weakness of enforcement mechanisms-were recognized
and addressed in the TRIPs Agreement. In 1994, TRIPs negoti-
ations were concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT
and the agreement establishing the WTO.17 The United States
provided the impetus for the development of the TRIPs Agree-
ment, in part because its economic incentives to push for strong
intellectual property protection are large. It is estimated that in
1989, U.S. exports of goods and services embodying intellectual
property amounted to nearly $60 billion.18 Thus, the desire to
combat piracy of U.S. products and protect this large income
base motivated the United States to create an effective multina-
tional intellectual property agreement that would identify and
require minimum standards for intellectual property protection
as well as provide for effective enforcement and dispute settle-
ment procedures. 19 Because of the perception that "the national
web of intellectual property laws has effectively created non-
tariff barriers that interfere with international trade and tech-
nology transfers,"20 the United States considered GATT to be an
excellent forum in which to harmonize protection of intellectual
property rights.
The inclusion of trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights in the Uruguay Round of GATT was met with much
resistance, particularly from developing nations, because many
14. Cordray, supra note 5, at 132.
15. Thomas, supra note 4, at 291.
16. Cordray, supra note 5, at 131.
17. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
18. THoMAs 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETAL-
IATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 191 (1994).
19. Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Pro-
tection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465,
465-68 (1994).
20. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 611.
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felt that such a topic exceeded GATT's mandate and that WIPO
was the proper forum for such negotiations. 21 However, resist-
ance subsided when the WIPO Director General agreed to par-
ticipate in the TRIPs negotiations. 22
Through the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United
States sought to rectify what it saw as major holes in existing
multinational intellectual property agreements. 23 For example,
the United States was concerned that the Paris Convention
failed to require patent protection for such important products
as chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 24 Many of the United States'
concerns were met within the formulation of TRIPs. First, pro-
visions for national treatment25 and most-favored-nation (MFN)
treatment,26 which mirror the general requirements contained
in the pre-Uruguay Round GATT, are contained in TRIPs. Sec-
ond, the copyright provisions call for a fifty-year term of protec-
tion 27 and for protection of computer programs and certain other
original data compilations. 28 A twenty-year term of protection
was granted for patents,29 which are to be available for any
product or process. 30 Significantly, TRIPs mandates that Mem-
bers enact domestic enforcement procedures to prevent infringe-
ment of intellectual property rights covered by the Agreement.31
Lastly, parties to TRIPs are required to settle disputes that
arise under the agreement by adhering to the GATT dispute res-
olution process. 32
A. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION UNDER TRIPs
As discussed above, detailed minimum standards must be
included in an international intellectual property agreement
21. Doane, supra note 19, at 472-73.
22. GATT Negotiating Group Sets Talks This Week on U.S. Proposal, WIPO
Will Join Discussion, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1358 (Nov. 4, 1987).
23. Myles S. Getlan, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative
Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 201 (1995).
24. Alan S. Gutterman, International Intellectual Property: A Summary of
Recent Developments and Issues for the Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335, 353 (1992).
25. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 3.
26. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 4.
27. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 12.
28. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 10.
29. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 33.
30. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 27(1).
31. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 41.
32. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 64.
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that provides for national treatment. TRIPs is governed by the
national treatment provisions of GATT and the WIPO Conven-
tions.33 Thus, the United States considered it vitally important
to ensure that TRIPs contain significant minimum standards.
These standards are binding on all Members, with grace periods
of compliance granted to developing countries, 34 and are to be
enforced through the GATT dispute settlement procedures. 35
TRIPs is divided into seven parts. Part II is entitled "Stan-
dards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual
Property Rights." This Part describes the substantive standards
for protection of copyrights, trademarks, geographical indica-
tions, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit topogra-
phies and undisclosed information (i.e. trade secrets), as well as
for control of anti-competitive practices in licensing.36 For ex-
ample, Articles 27-34 detail the protection to be afforded to pat-
ents. The provision defining patentable subject matter mirrors
U.S. patent law37 by providing that "patents shall be available
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application."38 However,
TRIPs allows for specific exclusions from patentability for surgi-
cal methods, plants or animals (other than micro-organisms),
and any invention whose commercial exploitation would
threaten "ordre public or morality."39 Other major provisions
governing patent protection include defining the exclusive rights
that each Member must afford patent holders (Article 28), plac-
ing minimum conditions on what a patent application should
disclose about the invention (Article 29), and providing a uni-
form patent term of twenty years from the date of filing (Article
33).
33. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 3.
34. TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 65-66.
35. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 64.
36. TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 9-40.
37. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.. . may obtain a patent therefor...."
U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The explanatory footnote 5 in TRIPs
Article 27 states, "the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial applica-
tion' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvi-
ous' and 'useful' respectively." This conforms to the language of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 103 (1994) requiring usefulness and non-obviousness.
38. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 27(1). This includes allowing exclusions
from patentability for inventions whose commercial exploitation is deemed by
the host country to threaten human, animal, and plant life or health or the
environment.
39. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 27
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Part III of TRIPs obligates Members to provide adequate
national enforcement. The national enforcement provision
provides:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this
Part are available under their laws so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringe-
ments and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements.
40
Members must make available fair and equitable judicial proce-
dures for civil infringement suits, including timely written no-
tice to defendants, the right to legal counsel, and the ability for
claimants to present all relevant evidence. 41 TRIPs also pro-
vides minimum rules of evidence;42 it requires that judicial au-
thorities have the power to grant injunctions, 43 award damages
and expenses, 44 and remove infringing goods from channels of
commerce; 45 and it requires that administrative procedures
whereby the importation of counterfeit goods may be stopped at
the border be available under certain circumstances. 46 All these
procedures for enforcement "shall be applied in such a manner
as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against their abuse."47
Finally, to allow the policing of Members' adherence to their
minimum obligations under the TRIPs standards, Article 63 sets
forth transparency requirements. All laws, regulations, final ju-
dicial decisions, and administrative rulings pertaining to TRIPs
must be published, if possible, or at least made publicly avail-
able so that other Members may have adequate access to
them.48 Members are obliged to automatically notify the Coun-
cil for TRIPs concerning amendments to their laws or adoption
of new laws pertaining to TRIPs, and they must supply any in-
formation of this sort requested by other Members. 4 9 These
transparency requirements are meant to facilitate compliance
40. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 41.
41. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 42.
42. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 43.
43. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 44(1).
44. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 45.
45. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 46.
46. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 51. Of course, such border measures must
conform with the provisions of MFN in GATT Article I and national treatment
under GATT Article III. Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellec-
tual Property Rights and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81, 91-92 (1992)
47. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 41.
48. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 63(1).
49. TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 63(2) and (3).
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with the substantive standards of TRIPs so that disputes may be
prevented. 50 Taken as a whole, TRIPs sets forth sufficiently de-
tailed minimum substantive standards of intellectual property
protection, the depth and breadth of which have no equal among
other multilateral intellectual property agreements.
B. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF TRIPs
TRIPs fills the second major hole left by other multinational
intellectual property agreements by providing a detailed dispute
settlement mechanism. This dispute settlement mechanism has
evolved over 50 years under GATT to become a "reasonably so-
phisticated dispute settlement process."5 1 The Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU), introduced with the recent WTO
Agreements, covers all the WTO Agreements, including
TRIPs.5 2
The DSU improved the old system53 through provisions that
guarantee a right to a panel,54 adoption of panel reports unless
there is a consensus to reject,55 appellate review of panel deci-
50. Article 63 of TRIPs appears in Part V, entitled "Dispute Prevention and
Settlement." It comes just before Article 64, which discusses dispute
settlement.
51. John H. Jackson, WTO and GATT, LAw QUADRANGLE NOTES (The Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School), Fall/Winter 1996, at 75.
52. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RE.
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 114 (1994), art. 1 [hereinafter
DSU].
53. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 339-44 (3d ed. 1995) (comparing old and new
GATT dispute resolution systems). The original GATT dispute settlement pro-
cess developed not from a detailed set of procedures, but rather according to
what worked. Id. at 339. The results of the evolution were ultimately codified
in the 1979 Tokyo Round understanding. Id. at 340. The basic understanding
was that when parties were unable to settle their dispute without the GATT's
intervention, a panel would be formed consisting of national representatives
from GATT Member nations or non-governmental individuals such as law
professors or former GATT officials. Id. at 339-40. However, panel formation
took place only upon consensus, so that one Member, including the "defendant"
party, was able to block formation. Id. at 341. Similarly, adoption of a panel
report was by consensus of all the members so that even the losing party could
block it. Id. at 342. This aspect of GATT dispute settlement was often criticized
even though the system as a whole was fairly successful. Id. at 343. A panel
report typically recommended that the losing party withdraw the offending
measures. Id. Recommendations left unimplemented would expose the offend-
ing party to suspension of trade concessions by the injured party. Id. at 344.
54. DSU, supra note 52, art. 6.
55. DSU, supra note 52, art. 16.
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sions, 56 and time limits upon which a Member must comply with
a final ruling.57 A final ruling of a violation requires the offend-
ing Member to either change the inconsistent measure or negoti-
ate a compensatory settlement.58 As a last resort, if the
offending Member fails to change the measure or compensate
the injured party, the WTO may authorize retaliation in the
form of suspension of trade concessions.59 When suspending
concessions, the complaining party is obligated to retaliate only
in the "same sector" in which the violation occurred, if possi-
ble.60 With respect to TRIPs concessions, "sectors" are defined
as each of the section headings of Part II of the TRIPs Agree-
ment.6 1 In other words, "sectors" for TRIPs dispute purposes
are either copyright and related rights, trademark rights, rights
regarding geographical indications, industrial design rights,
patent rights, and so on. What it means to retaliate within each
of these sectors is not entirely clear from the text of the DSU and
TRIPs. It will be interesting to see how WTO panels interpret
Article 22 of the DSU (setting forth the "same sector" require-
ment) with respect to TRIPs complaints.
The advantages of a set of minimum standards for intellec-
tual property protection coupled with an effective dispute settle-
ment mechanism are apparent. First, the easier it is for a
country to determine the source of a controversy and to ascer-
tain its obligations, the more cooperative that country is likely to
be.62 In addition, the multilateral nature of TRIPs and the DSU
as compared to more coercive unilateral or bilateral methods in-
creases the likelihood of adherence to the obligations and panel
recommendations. 63 More generally, the advantage of placing a
strong intellectual property agreement in the context of GATT is
that a broad range of terms are negotiated. Because GATT may
be viewed as a package deal rather than as a single item, na-
tions that, along with the United States, wish to increase the
levels of international intellectual property protection, have an
opportunity to do so simply by making concessions in other ar-
eas, such as lowering tariffs or other trade barriers. Conversely,
56. DSU, supra note 52, art. 17.
57. DSU, supra note 52, art. 21.
58. Nicole Telecki, Note, The Role of Special 301 in the Development of In-
ternational Protection of Intellectual Property Rights after the Uruguay Round,
14 B.U. IN'rL L.J. 187, 206 (1996).
59. DSU, supra note 52, art. 3.
60. DSU, supra note 52, art. 22.
61. Id.
62. Getlan, supra note 23, at 211.
63. Id.
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less developed nations may be willing to accept strong intellec-
tual property rights requirements in a package deal that pro-
vides tariff concessions and other protections. 64
Now that minimum standards and effective dispute settle-
ment have become reality in TRIPs, the United States must take
an active role to ensure that Members honor the provisions if it
wants to realize its vision of harmonized minimum standards of
intellectual property protection. To this end, the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) recently announced that the
United States expects all developed countries to comply with
TRIPs obligations on schedule and that the United States in-
tends to use the WTO dispute settlement process vigorously.65
In addition, current U.S. actions have shown its willingness to
pursue any means available under the WTO Agreements to en-
sure that developing countries comply with TRIPs to the extent
they are obligated to do so. 66
Because it is governed by WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures, TRIPs goes farther to provide adequate enforcement
mechanisms than any previous international intellectual prop-
erty agreement. However, TRIPs is not without shortcomings.
Indeed it poses serious practical problems, even for developed
countries, such as the United States, that have a vested interest
in strong international protection of intellectual property rights.
64. Cordray, supra note 5, at 143-44.
65. Tim Huber, USTR Announces Two Decisions: Title VII and Special
301, WEST LEGAL NEWS, May 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 359843. On Febru-
ary 9, 1996, the United States initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings
against Japan, complaining that Japan failed to protect the rights of U.S. per-
forming artists and producers between 1946 and 1971. Id. On March 11, 1996,
the USTR announced initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings against
Canada for its discriminatory protection of its domestic magazine industry. Id.
66. Id. In April 1996, the USTR announced that the United States would
initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Portugal, Turkey, India,
and Pakistan. Article 70 of TRIPs requires all countries that do not currently
provide patent protection for certain areas of technology to establish so-called
"mailbox" mechanisms by January 1, 1995. Id. These mailboxes would pre-
serve the patentability of products of the specified technologies until a patent
law is passed to protect them, even if the country in which the patent is sought
is eligible for the transition period made available by the TRIPs Agreement. Id.
Thus, developing countries cannot use the transition period for compliance to
deny protection to specific patent applications. The United States complains
that some of the countries listed do not provide mailbox mechanisms for tech-
nologies not currently provided patent protection such as pharmaceuticals and
agricultural chemicals. Id.
Recently, the United States secured a favorable WTO panel decision in its
complaint against India for failing to put "mailbox" mechanisms in place. See
generally 1997 WL 556224 (W.T.O.), Sept. 5, 1997.
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II. POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF TRIPS
Although TRIPs represents a major step forward in interna-
tional intellectual property agreements, two major problems
threaten its effectiveness for the United States. First, from the
perspective of a developed country like the United States, TRIPs
is overly conciliatory to developing countries. 67 The Agreement
over-emphasizes the special needs of developing countries that
must now generate or improve protection for intellectual prop-
erty.68 The second concern is best phrased as a question: how
will a "young and still untested international organization like
the WTO . . . hope to manage the complexities of the TRIPs
Agreement ... when so many of its constituent members lack
the legal infrastructure, technical skills, and philosophic com-
mitment to make it work[?]" 69 Such concerns are heightened by
the recognition that the WTO has little or no expertise in gov-
erning the complex trade issues involved with intellectual
property. 70
A. TRIPs CONCESSIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As noted above, one major downfall of TRIPs from the point
of view of the United States is the number of concessions
granted to developing countries. 7 ' The conflict over the differ-
ence in scope of intellectual property protection afforded by de-
veloped and developing countries, and the extent to which
TRIPs preserves this difference, poses significant obstacles. 72
As one major concession, TRIPs allows extended transition
periods for developing countries to comply with the minimum
standards. 73 Articles 65 to 67 of TRIPs define these grace peri-
ods. The earliest a Member country could be held to the obliga-
tions under TRIPs was January 1, 1996, or one year after the
WTO Agreement came into force.7 4 For developing countries,
the transition period extends to January 1, 2000.7 5 In addition,
67. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 616.
68. Id. at 603.
69. J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement: Introduction to
a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 367 (1996).
70. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 616.
71. For the purposes of this Note, "developing countries" includes countries
that are currently undergoing the transition from a centralized economy to a
free market economy.
72. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 612-13.
73. Telecki, supra note 58, at 210.
74. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 65(1).
75. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 65(2).
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any Member country in the process of transforming to a market
economy enjoys the same grace period allowed for developing
countries. 76 In terms of patent protection, developing countries
are allowed five years beyond the standard grace period to recog-
nize the patentability of inventions in technology areas previ-
ously not afforded protection. 77  Finally, less-developed
countries may also take advantage of a ten year transition pe-
riod, with the possibility of further extensions, from the date the
WTO Agreement came into force in which to comply with the
substantive standards of TRIPs. 78
Many consider these transition periods to be excessive. It is
speculated that, rather than using these periods to develop
meaningful intellectual property protection in compliance with
TRIPs, some developing countries will exploit the grace periods
by stepping-up already thriving pirating industries. 79 Indeed,
transitional periods for developing countries are more likely to
delay the growth of third-world economies by inhibiting their in-
tegration into the world market instead of encouraging their as-
similation through the recognition of the rights of intellectual
property owners.80 Developing countries tend to resist strength-
ening intellectual property protection because of the fear that in
so doing they will compromise any competitive advantage they
have over developed countries.8 1 Thus, developing countries
may consider the grace periods an opportunity to exploit their
competitive advantages by encouraging pirating efforts, while
more powerful countries remain obligated to honor TRIPs.
TRIPs does, however, contain a provision to encourage and
facilitate the implementation of its substantive standards in de-
veloping countries by obligating developed countries to provide,
upon request, technical and financial assistance regarding the
drafting of regulations and the establishment of agencies for en-
forcement.8 2 Although this provision is undoubtedly aimed at
accelerating developing countries' compliance, it does not ad-
dress the potential exploitation of grace periods through in-
creased pirating efforts.
76. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 65(3).
77. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 65(4).
78. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 66(1).
79. Doane, supra note 19, at 481.
80. Id.
81. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 612-13.
82. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 67.
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The second major concession to developing countries ema-
nates from the public policy exceptions to patentability allowed
under Article 27:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is neces-
sary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the envi-
ronment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.
The "escape clause" of Article 27 "arms the developing countries
with grounds for excluding from patentability important tech-
nology areas such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, agro-chemi-
cals, computers, and electronics simply on the pretense of public
policy."8 3 It is likely that this escape clause will be easily in-
voked by developing countries, because patenting such subject
matter is per se against public policy in many developing coun-
tries.8 4 Although developed as well as developing countries may
invoke this broad escape clause, it stands to reason that coun-
tries that have historically had less patent protection are more
likely to voice objections to patenting inventions in certain areas
of technology than developed countries that complied with the
substantive standards of TRIPs before they acceded to the
Agreement. Developed countries like the United States already
comply with the patentable subject matter provisions of TRIPs
and have long outgrown many of their policy-development grow-
ing pains. On the other hand, developing countries such as In-
dia have deeply-rooted objections to patenting products like
pharmaceuticals.8 5
In addition, as discussed above, TRIPs ultimately relies on
each individual Member for implementation. Although this pre-
serves national sovereignty for all Members, it primarily bene-
fits those countries with minimal existing intellectual property
protection.8 6 Generally, the laws of developed areas such as the
83. Id.
84. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 614.
85. Michael Yeh, Note, Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight Against Intel-
lectual Property Piracy in China, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 503, 506-08 (1996).
The usual objections of developing countries to granting patent monopolies are,
first, that patent protection tends to increase the costs of goods and, second,
that knowledge should benefit the public at minimal cost. Theresa Beeby
Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of the Pat-
ent Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L LAw. 835, 839 (1996). These objections
are even more powerful for pharmaceuticals patenting, because health care
costs are at stake. Id.
86. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 613. Another guarantee of sovereignty is
that the WTO cannot require a Member to change its laws to conform with a
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United States, Japan, Canada, and the European Union already
embody the intellectual property protections sought under
TRIPs. Consequently, the majority of the problems likely to
arise will concern whether the ultimate implementation of intel-
lectual property protection in developing countries fulfills TRIPs
obligations. Without adequate implementation, the United
States will not attain its goal of externalizing its strong intellec-
tual property protection through TRIPs.
While concessions to developing countries may have been
necessary both to gain their accession to the TRIPs Agreement
and to ensure their ultimate compliance, it is doubtful that the
concessions given will provide the necessary incentives for de-
veloping countries to meet the TRIPs standards as soon as possi-
ble. It is more likely that developing countries will attempt to
use these concessions to expand pirating efforts and retain every
competitive advantage possible.
B. THE WTO's LACK OF EXPERTISE IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MATTERS
Apart from the general questions regarding the WTO and
its ability to give effect to the results of the Uruguay Round, spe-
cific questions arise as to whether the WTO will be able to ex-
pand the success of the GATT philosophy and dispute
settlement process into the realm of intellectual property protec-
tion. The barriers to trade in intellectual property are "very dif-
ferent from those traditionally handled through the GATT."87
Intellectual property practice results in non-tariff trade barriers
that are often tied to ideas or technologies rather than goods,
and which reflect a particular nation's policy balance between
encouraging innovation and allowing the public free access.
Although governed by the DSU, TRIPs never spells out the spe-
cifics of how disputes over intellectual property are to be settled
given these unique considerations.88 The effectiveness of the
WTO dispute settlement process is thus an open question and
will remain so for a number of years, given the transitional ar-
dispute settlement ruling. "[Tihe good news is that the United States is not
required to comply with [an adverse ruling] ... [but tihe correspondingly bad
news is that neither is any other member." Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 Am. J. IN'L L. 416, 418
(1996).
87. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 616.
88. Id.
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rangement for developing countries.8 9 The WTO seems to have
anticipated a lack of expertise in this area, however, and hopes
to alleviate this problem by establishing "a mutually supportive
relationship between the WTO and [WIPOI."90 To solidify this
commitment, an agreement was reached between WIPO and the
WTO which sets forth, in general terms, how the two organiza-
tions will share information and expertise.91
In addressing the problems associated with managing the
complexities of such a comprehensive intellectual property
agreement as TRIPs (when many of the developing country
Members lack the tools necessary for implementation), the WTO
stresses the importance of transparency. 92 The hope is that
transparency will deter Members from enacting non-conforming
legislation and encourage Members to implement adequate in-
ternal enforcement measures. 93 Such reliance on transparency
measures, however, places a heavy burden on the dispute settle-
ment procedures. Unless other Members report non-compliance,
transparency will have no effect. Also, if non-compliance is re-
ported but dispute settlement proves inadequate, then trans-
parency will again have no effect. The WTO also emphasizes the
importance of giving technical assistance to developing coun-
tries as they reform their intellectual property laws. 94 However,
there is no guarantee that such assistance will be either wel-
comed or heeded. Regardless, only effective dispute settlement
will be able to correct compliance efforts that come up short.
The WTO will need to rely on the assistance of other organiza-
tions, especially WIPO, for suggestions. 95 However, the efficacy
89. The effectiveness of the DSU with regard to TRIPs will remain an open
question for a few years with regard to developed countries as well. Article 64
of TRIPs provides that the DSU shall not be applied to non-violation nullifica-
tion or impairment for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement. See DSU, supra note 52. This means that for those five
years only complaints of direct violations of TRIPs by developed countries may
be the subject of WTO dispute settlement. This will severely limit the number
of cases that will go through the entire DSU process. Thus, the drawing of in-
ferences about the future of dispute settlement under TRIPs will be tenuous
even after those five years.
90. TRIPs, supra note 17, preamble.
91. Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the World Trade Organization (visited Aug. 20, 1997), <http://www.wto.orgwto/
intellec/17-wipo.htm>.
92. Reichman, supra note 69, at 368 (discussing the views of Adrian Otten,
Director of the WTO's Intellectual Property and Investment Division and his
deputy, Hannu Wager, of the WTO's Legal Affairs Office).
93. Id. at 368-69.
94. Id. at 369.
95. Id.
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of such collaborations remains to be seen since WIPO itself has
never administered an intellectual property agreement with
such a wide set of minimum standards and a mature dispute
settlement process.
In the broader picture, uncertainties arise concerning the
willingness of the WTO to allow the imposition of strong intellec-
tual property policy on resistant developing countries, even
though TRIPs requires such an imposition. To illustrate, a com-
parison can be drawn with the GATT's past treatment of envi-
ronmental measures. For example, in the Tuna/Dolphin case, a
GATT panel reasoned that although a Member country has
every right to develop its own environmental protection policies,
it may not unilaterally force other Members to adopt the same
policies by refusing to import goods produced in a manner that
would violate the environmental measure if produced domesti-
cally.96 The panel was concerned that more powerful Members
could expand their environmental policies outside their jurisdic-
tion by denying less powerful Members their rights under
GATT. 97 Like environmental regulations, intellectual property
laws embody unique national policy judgments, and attempts to
externalize these laws necessarily infringe upon the sovereignty
of other nations.98 Thus, GATT history indicates that the WTO
may be reluctant to force developing countries to change their
deeply-rooted intellectual property policies, even though TRIPs
sets particular standards.
For these reasons, the ability to bind developing countries to
the minimum standards of TRIPs hinges on the very aspect that
raises the most questions concerning the efficacy of TRIPs - the
dispute settlement process. In addition, the concessions af-
forded developing countries provide no positive incentives for
meaningful implementation of intellectual property protection,
and may even hinder such efforts.
III. UNILATERAL PROTECTION WITH SPECIAL 301
In 1988, dissatisfied with the international protection for in-
tellectual property provided by multilateral efforts such as the
Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, Congress created
96. See generally United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from
Mexico, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 204 (1993) (panel report not adopted by
GATT Contracting Parties) (finding that the United States could not justify its
import restrictions).
97. Id.
98. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 582-83.
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section 182 of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974. 99 Section 182,
commonly referred to as "Special 301," allows the United States
to identify countries that deny adequate protection to U.S. intel-
lectual property rights, and to encourage any country so identi-
fied to alter its offending practices. 10 0 What follows is a brief
description of the evolution of Special 301 from its inception to
the present day.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal statu-
tory mechanism by which the United States protects U.S. export
of goods and services from foreign unfair trade practices. 10 1 The
1974 version of section 301 expanded the President's authority
to respond to foreign unfair trade practices and allowed private
parties to petition the USTR to investigate complaints of unfair
trade barriers.10 2 The 1984 amendment to section 301 author-
ized the USTR to initiate investigations without a presidential
order or a private party petition.'0 3 Congress periodically
amended section 301 to increase executive branch authority in
the hopes that the USTR would become more aggressive in
bringing and prosecuting section 301 cases.10 4 In the 1988 Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Congress continued this
process by creating mandates for the USTR to initiate section
301 procedures and to retaliate in cases where unfair trade prac-
tices could not be cured through negotiations.' 0 5 Congress also
tightened up the deadlines, allowing a maximum of 18 months
between initiation and retaliation even if dispute settlement
procedures were still underway. 10 6
As part of the 1984 amendments to section 301, Congress
required the executive branch to produce a report identifying
99. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 182, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994)).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 2242. The Office of the USTR was created as the Office of
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations by Exec. Order No. 11,075, 3
C.F.R. 692 (1959-1963). The Trade Act of 1972, 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1994), estab-
lished the Office as an agency of the Executive Office of the President charged
with administering trade agreements and setting and implementing overall
trade policy.
101. Timothy C. Bickham, Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Abroad with Special 301, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 195, 198 (1996).
102. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 26-27.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 28.
105. Id. at 29.
106. Id.
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barriers to U.S. exports, including any actions deemed to deny
protection for U.S. intellectual property rights. 10 7 In the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act, Special 301 was added.' 08 Special 301 re-
quires the USTR to identify and investigate each foreign country
whose acts, policies, or practices deny adequate intellectual
property rights or fair market access.' 0 9 These countries,
deemed "priority foreign countries" (PFCs), are considered to be
those "that have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or
practices that deny adequate and effective intellectual property
rights,""10 and "whose acts.., have the greatest adverse impact
... on the relevant United States products.""' The designation
of PFC will be removed if the country in question has entered
into good faith negotiations or made significant progress toward
providing adequate protection for U.S. intellectual property
rights. 112
In the first Special 301 report released by the USTR in May
1989, no cited countries were identified as PFCs even though the
USTR concluded that none of the countries cited provided ade-
quate protection of intellectual property. 113 Twenty-five of those
countries were named to watch lists, and the USTR scrutinized
those watch-listed countries for progress in improved recogni-
tion of intellectual property rights. 1 4 In April 1990, the USTR
again declined to designate any watch-listed country as a PFC,
under the rationale that adequate progress had been made." 15
The first PFCs, China, India, and Thailand, were designated by
the USTR in its third annual report in 1991.116 This more
proactive approach by the USTR coincided with stalled TRIPs
negotiations.1 7 Thus, negotiation challenges in the Uruguay
Round shifted U.S. policy toward placing more emphasis on Spe-
cial 301.118
A particularly illustrative case is the Special 301 action
against Brazil for its failure to provide patent protection to
pharmaceuticals. The USTR initiated a section 301 action in
107. JACKSON, supra note 53, at 832.
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
109. JACKSON, supra note 53, at 832.
110. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A)(i).
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(B).
112. Getlan, supra note 23, at 183.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 184.
118. Id.
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1987 in response to complaints from the Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers Association (PMA) that Brazil encouraged piracy, cost-
ing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry millions of dollars
annually. 119 Brazil initially refused to negotiate, and in 1988
the United States retaliated by imposing 100% tariffs on $39
million worth of Brazilian exports including paper products,
drugs, and electronics. 120 Brazil responded by complaining that
the U.S. retaliation was illegal under GATT because it violated
tariff bindings. 121 The United States repeatedly blocked efforts
to form a GATT panel to settle the Brazilian complaint.122
When Brazil finally agreed to introduce legislation to protect
pharmaceuticals, the United States withdrew section 301 sanc-
tions and Brazil dropped its GATT complaint. 123 In April 1993,
because Brazil had still failed to implement the promised legis-
lation, the USTR designated Brazil as a PFC under Special 301
and threatened to renew sanctions. 124 In negotiations, Brazil
once again promised to enact corrective legislation, and the
United States withdrew its threat.125
It is difficult to assess whether U.S. Special 301 actions such
as the one against Brazil have been effective. As the Brazil case
illustrates, Special 301 actions tend to drag out over long periods
of time as they cycle between threats by the United States and
unfulfilled promises by the foreign nation in question. 126 In-
deed, none of the intellectual property cases under Special 301
have been satisfactorily resolved in the section 301 time frame of
six to nine months. 127 Moreover, even when corrective legisla-
tion is implemented, there is no guarantee that effective enforce-
ment will be provided.
119. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 187.
120. Id. at 197-98.
121. See id. at 187, 198.
122. Id. at 188. Before the new WTO Agreements, the formation of a GATT
panel and the adoption of a panel report required a consensus. Thus, any Mem-
ber, including the offending party in a particular case, could block panel forma-
tion. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World
Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAw. 1095, 1096-97
(1994). In order to avoid such a possibility, the DSU needed overhauling so that
the TRIPs Agreement could be effective. Getlan, supra note 23, at 204.
123. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 187.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 188. "[Elven with highly credible U.S. threats of [unilateral] re-
taliation, it is exceedingly time-consuming and difficult to achieve effective [in-
tellectual property] protection in developing countries in which powerful groups
oppose it." Id. at 200.
127. Id. at 200.
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GATT Members have sharply criticized the United States
for its use of Special 301, charging that it violates the spirit, if
not the letter, of GATT.128 The United States responds to this
criticism by maintaining that unilateral coercion under Special
301 is not inconsistent with GATT because GATT never contem-
plated the protection of intellectual property. 129 This argument
highlights a defect in GATT, one which allowed the United
States to leverage the inclusion of intellectual property protec-
tion in the Uruguay Round.130 While Special 301 may have had
limited success in unilaterally coercing foreign countries to
change their deeply-rooted intellectual property policies, "at the
very least it seems plausible that aggressive [U.S.] unilateralism
encouraged developing countries to negotiate on intellectual
property in the [Uruguay] round as a way of establishing rules
to restrain U.S. unilateralism."131 Although one goal of aggres-
sive use of Special 301 may have been to leverage TRIPs negoti-
ations, it is clear that the United States also intends to continue
vigorously using Special 301 for its originally designed
purposes. 132
B. USE OF SPECIAL 301 TO SUPPLEMENT TRIPs
The Special 301 process may be used as a means to monitor
trading partners with respect to their compliance with TRIPs.
In this manner, the Special 301 process could be used to acceler-
ate the conformity of developing countries with TRIPs during
their transition periods. 133 It may also be used to identify non-'
conforming developed countries and to initiate WTO dispute set-
tlement proceedings.' 3 4  The United States may, in any case,
continue to use Special 301 against GATT non-Members.
The first scenario in which the United States may justify its
continued use of Special 301 is to encourage developing coun-
tries, and those countries moving towards a free market econ-
128. Getlan, supra note 23, at 177.
129. Id. at 175-77.
130. Id.
131. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 207.
132. Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong. 213 (1994) (statement of Mickey Kan-
tor, U.S. Trade Representative). Using Special 301, the USTR recently identi-
fied 35 countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property or fair and equitable market access to U.S. products embodying pro-
tected intellectual property. According to the USTR, nineteen other trading
partners will require monitoring. Huber, supra note 65.
133. Doane, supra note 19, at 493.
134. Telecki, supra note 58, at 198.
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omy, to comply as quickly as possible with TRIPs standards. 135
Because the grace periods granted to these Members may be ex-
ploited by increased piracy or grace period extensions, the
United States will attempt to force developing countries to com-
ply with TRIPs as soon as possible by threatening Special 301-
type sanctions.' 36 The Brazil pharmaceuticals case is an early
indication of the efficacy of such a plan. Due to continued
threats of retaliation under Special 301, Brazil ultimately
agreed to immediate implementation of TRIPs standards with-
out regard to the transition period it was allowed as a develop-
ing country.137
Despite this apparent success, some scholars warn that the
potency of Special 301 will be diminished during the phase-in
period for developing countries, and thus Special 301 will have
little utility in coercing Members to accelerate their compli-
ance. 38 This view is premised on the opinion that the emer-
gence of TRIPs will heighten the effectiveness of Special 301
only when used in conjunction with the WTO dispute settlement
process. 139 This would render Special 301 all but useless
against developing countries, which have no obligation to com-
ply with TRIPs during their transition periods.
Another use of Special 301 review is to monitor other Mem-
bers' degree of compliance with TRIPs. "Participating in the
Special 301 review allows [U.S. intellectual property rights hold-
ers to file complaints with] the USTR in a unique forum that
addresses current international trade issues and gives [them] a
chance to influence economic policy in line with [their] business
interests.' 40 The review system relies on information provided
by domestic businesses, producers and organizations that pos-
sess an intimate familiarity with any inadequacies in the intel-
lectual property protection provided by foreign countries. Using
this information, the United States can more efficiently monitor
questionable trade practices and engage offending countries in
135. Getlan, supra note 23, at 215. However, some suggest that the contin-
ued use of Special 301 against developing countries would be susceptible to at-
tack as a nullification of the transitional period allowed developing countries.
See Yeh, supra note 85, at 515 (explaining the dangers of the USTR's use of
Special 301).
136. Bickham, supra note 101, at 207-08.
137. Doane, supra note 19, at 493.
138. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 204.
139. Id.
140. Bickham, supra note 101, at 197. For example, the Brazil pharma-
ceuticals case was initiated based on complaints by a private organization of
pharmaceuticals manufacturers.
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consultations on a regular basis. 14 1 Special 301, as it stands to-
day, requires that the USTR monitor the protection of intellec-
tual property provided by other countries and bring disputes
that arise to the WTO dispute settlement process when a coun-
try violates U.S. rights under TRIPs.142
It is also argued that Special 301 will be more efficient when
used in conjunction with TRIPs because the minimum substan-
tive standards provided by TRIPs serve as a uniform target for
compliance. The utility of TRIPs in a Special 301 action is that
it provides a baseline of intellectual property protection that
Special 301 by itself lacks.' 43 For instance, in the Brazil
pharmaceuticals case, the United States withdrew sanctions
and threats of sanctions as soon as Brazil promised to change its
laws because the United States had no benchmark standards
which it could reasonably expect Brazil to meet.' 44 If a similar
case arose today, the trigger for lifting sanctions would not be
promises, but rather compliance with TRIPs.' 45 Thus, it is pos-
ited that the United States will no longer need to use Special
301 as a way to unilaterally force other countries to provide in-
tellectual property protection, but only as a method of encourag-
ing compliance with TRIPs, and perhaps as a method of
providing additional protection above and beyond the scope of
TRIPs. 146 It should be noted that the United States announced
its intention to use Special 301 not only as a method to ensure
full participation in the DSU and compliance with TRIPs, but
also to secure the continued development of intellectual property
protection in nations that are not Members of the WTO Agree-
ments, such as China.147
IV. SPECIAL 301 AS A GATT VIOLATION
The major problem affecting the efficacy of Special 301 as a
TRIPs supplement is that Members to the WTO Agreements are
hostile to efforts by the United States to unilaterally enforce in-
ternational patent rights. 148 An example of this came in 1989
when a GATT panel ruled that section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, a provision drawn to block goods that infringe upon U.S.
141. Id. at 208.
142. Telecki, supra note 58, at 208.
143. Id. at 209.
144. Getlan, supra note 23, at 216.
145. Id.
146. Bickham, supra note 101, at 209.
147. Telecki, supra note 58, at 212.
148. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 603.
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patents, violated the national treatment provision of Article
III:4 of the GATT. 149 Since then, both section 337 and Special
301 have been highly criticized because their use against GATT
Members seemingly violates major provisions of GATT. z5 0 The
view is widely held, even in developed countries, that
"[ulnilateral action, such as that which can be taken under Spe-
cial 301, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the GATT." 15'
It is further argued that, even though Special 301 may have
previously served a purpose, the implementation of TRIPs was
meant to abolish Special 301 actions by replacing them with
GATT dispute settlement mechanisms. 52 The United States
may be responsible for the genesis of this argument, having used
the Special 301 sanctions against Brazil to leverage the TRIPs
negotiations even though these sanctions "were clearly illegal
[under GATT], and other GATT Members widely condemned
them."15 3 Thus, by agreeing to TRIPs, other countries were in
effect attempting to ensure that the United States would be pre-
cluded from implementing such methods of unilateral coercion
in the future. The implication is that the use of unilateral coer-
cion to force intellectual property protection in the face of TRIPs
violates the entire purpose of the TRIPs Agreement.
There are two ways in which Special 301 retaliation may
violate the WTO Agreements. First, a Special 301 action used
against a GATT Member for violating TRIPs, thereby supersed-
ing WTO dispute settlement, violates the WTO Agreements.
The DSU requires Members to invoke the dispute settlement
mechanism without making unilateral determinations regard-
ing violations of any of the WTO Agreements.154 The United
States also interprets GATT Article XXIII (covering dispute set-
tlement) to require Members to resort solely to the DSU when a
dispute arises under any of the covered agreements.155 How-
ever, the United States has taken steps to ensure that this po-
tential violation is unlikely to arise. The amended Special 301
now requires that the USTR refer any alleged violations of any
WTO Agreement, including TRIPs, to the WTO dispute settle-
ment body (DSB), thus precluding the United States from im-
149. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 395 (1990).
150. Sabatelli, supra note 2, at 617.
151. Matsushita, supra note 46, at 90.
152. Id. at 85.
153. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 188.
154. Telecki, supra note 58, at 213-14.
155. Id. at 218-19.
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posing unilateral sanctions via Special 301.156 In other words,
the United States plans to use the Special 301 mechanism
merely as a means to identify countries in violation of TRIPs
and to notify the WTO of these violations. The United States
considers that the requirement to refer disputes under TRIPs to
the WTO makes Special 301 procedurally consistent with the
DSU.' 5 7
In addition to using Special 301 actions against GATT
Members for TRIPs violations, using Special 301 against GATT
Members for behavior that is not TRIPs-illegal may also violate
the WTO Agreements. "The United States arguably must re-
frain from using Special 301 against a TRIPs Member to force
further development of international intellectual property stan-
dards beyond those provided by the TRIPs regime."15 8 This situ-
ation resembles the era in which the United States used Special
301 to force GATT Members to develop stronger intellectual
property protection, as in the Brazil pharmaceuticals case. That
case was never decided by a GATT panel because the United
States blocked panel formation efforts.' 5 9 Although the common
view among Members was that the use of Special 301 against
Brazil violated GATT, 160 there was never any panel report an-
nouncing this view. In the new DSU, however, panel formation
is automatic unless there is a consensus against it.161 There-
fore, the United States will be unable to block panel formation or
panel reports in future disputes over retaliation under Special
301 that are aimed at gaining intellectual property protection
beyond the obligations of TRIPs.
Special 301 is also inconsistent with TRIPs in the scope of
its remedies. TRIPs allows only same-sector retaliation whereas
156. Id. "[The obligation to turn to the DSB is considered by the United
States to strengthen the effectiveness of Special 301 because it promotes the
use of a stronger dispute settlement system under the DSU to enforce intellec-
tual property protection that previously did not exist under the GATT." Id.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act amends the Special 301 procedures to
give priority to DSU procedures when the dispute falls under TRIPs. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4814 (1994) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
The U.S. Congress amended Special 301 to ensure it would not conflict with
U.S. obligations under TRIPs and the DSU. Specifically, Special 301 now coor-
dinates its time limits in a manner consistent with the formal requirements of
the DSU. Telecki, supra note 58, at 194.
157. Bickham, supra note 101, at 201-02.
158. Telecki, supra note 58, at 220.
159. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 188.
160. Id. at 198.
161. Bello & Holmer, supra note 122, at 1099.
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Special 301 may be used in a more coercive manner. The DSU
calls for withholding only same-sector concessions, where possi-
ble, which means "the new dispute resolution system under
TRIPs seeks to target industries that will ultimately benefit
from the greater protection of intellectual property rights that
will result from the DSB action.' 62 As discussed above, sectors
are defined for the purposes of retaliation by the areas of protec-
tion enumerated in the TRIPs Agreement. 163 For example, in
the Brazil pharmaceuticals case, the United States imposed
100% tariffs under section 301 on a variety of products, some of
which bore no relation to the pharmaceuticals for which the
United States sought patent protection in Brazil.164 However, if
this case had been brought under the DSU as a TRIPs violation
and the United States prevailed over Brazil, retaliation would
be limited to Brazilian exports related to the subject matter of
the dispute. Retaliation, if ultimately authorized by the WTO,
would be limited to same-sector retaliation. The retaliation lim-
itations built into the DSU, coupled with the obligation of Mem-
bers to utilize the DSU to deal with disputes arising under the
WTO Agreements, imply that retaliation under Special 301 be-
yond the scope of the DSU violates the WTO Agreements.
Although it remains to be seen whether the amended Spe-
cial 301 will be used in a manner that violates WTO obligations,
it is clear that unilateral judgment and retaliation by the United
States over intellectual property disputes with other WTO Mem-
bers violates the WTO Agreements. If the United States intends
to continue its use of Special 301 as a mechanism of unilateral
coercion, it should be prepared to offer compensation.
A. THE UNITED STATES AS A TRIPs PLAINTIFF
In order to examine the likely role that Special 301 may
play in TRIPs disputes, it is helpful to consider separately what
may happen with the United States as a plaintiff and as a de-
fendant in a TRIPs dispute.
First, recall that the United States wants to externalize its
strong intellectual property protection by supporting a multilat-
eral agreement that provides sufficient minimum standards of
protection and adequate enforcement mechanisms. Without
strong protection for intellectual property abroad, U.S. industry
162. Getlan, supra note 23, at 210.
163. DSU, supra note 52, art. 22.
164. BAYARD, supra note 18, at 197-98.
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stands to lose billions of dollars annually. 165 As a TRIPs plain-
tiff, it is in the best interest of the United States to seek not
merely compensation for injuries from TRIPs violations, but the
full compliance of violating Members. This necessitates full rec-
ognition, implementation and enforcement of the TRIPs stan-
dards in these countries. Without this, the United States will be
forced to continuously seek compensation through WTO dispute
settlement procedures for every injury U.S. industry endures.
Full compliance prevents such injury in the first place.
Although the current WTO dispute settlement procedures
prefer compliance with GATT and the various side agreements,
if negotiation and panel recommendations fail to compel the of-
fending country to change its laws, the WTO allows the offend-
ing party to provide compensation to the injured party.166 Only
as a last resort may the injured party retaliate. 167 The multi-
level structure of alternative remedies embodied by the DSU is
meant to ensure that preferable trade conditions will be restored
without forcing an unwilling Member to change its laws. Since
the WTO views compensation as a viable alternative to compli-
ance, it is unlikely that full compliance will be forced in a TRIPs
dispute. This is especially true with regard to developing coun-
tries that would prefer the imposition of sanctions over being
forced to change their laws.
Two observations support the contention that the WTO will
be unwilling to infringe the sovereignty of developing countries
by forcing their compliance with TRIPs. First, as noted above,
TRIPs provides powerful concessions to developing countries
which limit their compliance obligations.' 68 A concern for the
plight of developing countries and a reluctance to push too hard
is already built into the Agreement, presumably in order to pro-
tect their fragile economies from undue burdens. Second, the
WTO has stressed the involvement of WIPO in settling disputes
under TRIPs. It is no secret why developing countries insisted
on WIPO's involvement in TRIPs even during the Uruguay
Round negotiations - developing countries hold a substantial
165. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that in 1988 U.S.
companies lost $43 billion to $61 billion to piracy of intellectual property. ADvi-
SORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE POLICY NEGOTIATIONS, A REPORT To THE PREsI-
DENT, CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING
THE URUGUAY RouND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAR-
IFFS AND TRADE 67 (1994).
166. DSU, supra note 52, art. 22.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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voting bloc in WIPO, and can therefore leverage WIPO's sympa-
thies. 169 The willingness of the WTO to rely on the judgment of
WIPO, in addition to the concessions granted to developing
countries under TRIPs, evidences a low probability that the
WTO will exert much force to ensure full TRIPs compliance by
developing countries.
Taking all this into consideration, if the United States
wishes to compel developing countries to comply with TRIPs by
changing their laws, it is not likely to achieve that objective
through the WTO dispute settlement process. The only other al-
ternative, aside from accepting compensation, is to resort to uni-
lateral threats to compel change. In order to realize the gains in
international intellectual property protection expected under
TRIPs, the United States will eventually need to rely on unilat-
eral measures such as Special 301.
B. THE UNITED STATES AS A TRIPs DEFENDANT
The problems that will arise when the United States is a
TRIPs plaintiff are predicated on the well-founded assumption
that the WTO will resist forcing developing countries to change
their laws. However, the United States has long suspected that
international agencies such as the WTO may overstep their
bounds and infringe on U.S. sovereignty. 170 Although the exer-
cise of such power by the WTO would help the United States as
a TRIPs plaintiff, it would hurt the United States as a TRIPs
defendant.
There is a perception that, because the DSU is now more
effective, the new WTO dispute settlement procedure may prove
disadvantageous when the United States must defend itself.' 7 '
This is especially true under the TRIPs provisions. In general,
with a more effective DSU, developing countries may be less in-
timidated by U.S. coercion through Special 301. Because actions
by the United States under Special 301 may very well violate
WTO rules, such actions would be open to challenge by trading
partners. The more powerful DSU may be seen as an invitation
for other Members to challenge U.S. Special 301 actions. "The
expectation engendered by the new system-that little countries
as well as big, powerful ones might be able to stand up to U.S.
169. Cordray, supra note 5, at 137.
170. For example, the proposal to establish an International Trade Organi-
zation through the 1948 draft Havana Charter failed because it was not ratified
by the U.S. Congress. See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 92.
171. Getlan, supra note 23, at 215-16.
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'bullying' under section 301-could undermine the credibility of
the U.S. threat of unilateral action, and thus the success of sec-
tion 301-type programs.'u 2
On the other hand, it is also argued that the United States
will continue to use Special 301 despite TRIPs because the WTO
multilateral dispute settlement process is perceived to threaten
U.S. sovereignty. 173 Unless strong unilateral methods are pre-
served as viable options, the United States may lose its ability to
autonomously protect its own intellectual property because its
unilateral arsenal will be reduced.' 74 Despite such concerns,
some argue that the United States should not be concerned
about loss of sovereignty. If the United States is willing to ac-
cept trade sanctions as a TRIPs defendant, it need not change its
laws upon an adverse decision by a panel, and may in fact feel
free to adopt provisions that violate TRIPs, if necessary.' 7 5 In
addition, if the United States believes that the WTO has greatly
overstepped its bounds by infringing upon U.S. sovereignty over
intellectual property laws, the United States has the option,
however drastic, of opting out of the WTO altogether. 176
The United States, as the world's largest exporter, has a
vested interest in strengthened WTO dispute settlement. 177
However, the stronger the dispute settlement process, the
greater the probability that the United States, as a TRIPs de-
fendant, will perceive it as an infringement on national sover-
eignty. The weaker the dispute settlement, the less likely the
United States as a TRIPs plaintiff will be able to count on the
DSU to compel violating countries to change. Under either sce-
nario, the United States will find it necessary to resort to unilat-
eral measures such as Special 301 to compel change or simply
assert sovereign power, regardless of whether such unilateral
measures violate the very agreements which the United States
seeks to effectuate.
172. Bello & Holmer, supra note 122, at 1102.
173. Getlan, supra note 23, at 215-16.
174. Again, an analogy may be drawn between possible loss of sovereignty
over intellectual matters and the loss of sovereignty over health and environ-
mental standards. Id.
175. Bello & Holmer, supra note 122, at 1102-03.
176. Getlan, supra note 23, at 215-16.
177. Bello & Holmer, supra note 122, at 1102-03.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES TRIPS OVER
SPECIAL 301
The United States has pursued a clear policy of attempting
to secure strong intellectual property rights worldwide. To this
end, it has employed unilateral measures such as Special 301,
has sought protection under the various WIPO Conventions,
and, most significantly, has succeeded in introducing TRIPs,
which provides minimum substantive standards governed by
the WTO dispute settlement procedures. However, these efforts
are not without their respective imperfections. It is with respect
to these imperfections that the interaction among these efforts,
and primarily between Special 301 and TRIPs, must be
analyzed.
There are two major shortcomings of TRIPs. First, it treats
developing countries preferentially even though they are the
very countries that provide the least protection for intellectual
property rights. Second, it is unlikely that the DSU will be effec-
tive in securing the TRIPs compliance of developing countries,
especially in light of the WTO's sympathies for developing
countries.
In the past, the United States has responded to industry
complaints against the inadequate protection of intellectual
property by implementing Special 301 actions. With the intro-
duction of TRIPs, it is anticipated that the United States will no
longer need to rely on such methods of unilateral coercion. How-
ever, the major problems embodied in the TRIPs Agreement di-
rectly undermine this expectation. The United States will find
that without more forceful threats, the mere referral of TRIPs
violation complaints to the WTO likely will not lead to an ade-
quate resolution of the problem - an adequate resolution being
the full compliance of the violating country with TRIPs stan-
dards. Therefore, if it wishes to achieve full compliance and not
merely to secure trade concessions, the United States must look
beyond the scope of the DSU for coercive power. The only viable
alternative seems to be the unilateral measure of Special 301.
The fatal error with reliance on Special 301 to effectuate
TRIPs is that such actions violate the WTO Agreements. The
DSU requires that Members seek resolution of TRIPs com-
plaints exclusively through WTO dispute settlement procedures.
In addition, the scope and severity of trade sanctions tradition-
ally imposed under section 301 violates both the letter and the
spirit of GATT, which binds all Members to maximum tariffs
and prohibits quantitative border restrictions. Also, GATT
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panels have rejected U.S. arguments that GATT-illegal meas-
ures to protect intellectual property rights are necessary to pro-
tect national security.
The United States has dealt with the problem of GATT-
illegality by blocking panel formation when Special 301 retalia-
tion prompted complaints. However, that option is no longer
available under the new DSU which guarantees panel formation
and panel report adoption. Thus, by using Special 301 to pro-
mote compliance with TRIPs when the DSU fails to compel such
compliance, the United States will open itself up to attack under
the WTO Agreements. The new DSU will therefore encourage
developing countries to file complaints against the United States
for retaliatory use of Special 301. The almost certain result
would be a finding that such Special 301 measures violate the
WTO Agreements.
Upon such a finding, the United States will be required to
either withdraw the violating measure by discontinuing its use
of Special 301 or offer trade concessions to compensate the party
being injured by the retaliation. Because Special 301 retaliation
comes in the form of trade restrictions, compensatory trade con-
cessions will serve only to nullify any effect that the retaliation
had in the first instance. Thus, the result under each alterna-
tive is the same. The United States will be unable to effectively
use Special 301 retaliation to enforce the standards of TRIPs
when the DSU proves to be an inadequate enforcement
mechanism.
In the past, mere threats by the United States, without re-
taliation, were often enough to prompt a country to negotiate
settlements or promise compliance. Now, the strengthened dis-
pute settlement procedures will undermine the potency of Spe-
cial 301 even as a method to communicate such threats. These
threats will lose all credibility because the United States will
not be able to make good on them without violating the WTO
Agreements. Developing countries will no longer be intimidated
when the United States threatens unilateral action because they
will be able to bring complaints before the WTO knowing that
the United States will not be able to block panel formation. It
follows that the strengthened dispute settlement process pro-
vides more incentives for developing nations to ignore the stan-
dards of TRIPs and increase pirating efforts in the hope that the
DSU will do more to curb the retaliatory propensities of the
United States than to force compliance by developing countries.
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Rather than increasing worldwide adherence to strong stan-
dards of intellectual property protection, it seems that TRIPs
under the strengthened DSU has simultaneously increased the
need for the United States to rely on unilateral coercion to en-
sure TRIPs compliance and undermined the ability of the
United States to use that coercion. Although TRIPs seemed to
fill the holes left by other international intellectual property
agreements (i.e. the lack of minimum substantive standards and
inadequate enforcement measures), its conciliatory attitude to-
wards developing countries provides few assurances that it will
be effective in promoting worldwide intellectual property protec-
tion. If, as this Note predicts, the United States proves unable
to use the DSU to compel TRIPs compliance by developing coun-
tries, it will have taken a step backward in its efforts to exter-
nalize strong intellectual property protection. This is because
retaliation under Special 301 and other methods of unilateral
coercion will no longer be available, even to the limited extent
that unilateral retaliation was effective before the implementa-
tion of TRIPs.
Of course, the major question yet to be determined is
whether and to what extent the WTO will hold developing coun-
tries to the standards of TRIPs. The conciliatory treatment of
developing countries within TRIPs itself, along with the seem-
ingly sympathetic posture of the WTO toward developing coun-
tries, indicates that TRIPs will fall short of providing the
necessary incentives for developing countries to conform to the
enumerated minimum substantive standards of intellectual
property protection. If this is true, the United States will have
lost its unilateral mechanisms of intellectual property protection
in the pursuit of multilateral mechanisms which have little or
no effect.
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